Shadow of the Dragon - The History of Taiwan & China 

Quick context: ROC (Republic of China) = Taiwan (the nationalist government that lost the civil war, retreated to Taiwan). PRC (People's Republic of China) = Mainland China (Mao).

#US, Taiwan, and History of Strategic Ambiguity

1. Before Nixon, the US recognized the ROC (Taiwan) as the legitimate government of all of China. Taiwan held China's UN seat. The US had a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan, tens of thousands of troops stationed there, and nuclear weapons on the island. The US refused to acknowledge the PRC existed as a legitimate government at all; they were enemies who had fought each other in the Korean War.

2. During the Cold War, an opportunity opens up: China and Soviet relations sour. They disagreed on how to do communism. Mao thought the Soviets had gone soft and weren't real Marxists, the Soviets thought Mao was reckless and ungrateful (USSR was crucial reason that CCP modernized and survived).

3. Nixon trades Taiwan for leverage against the Soviet Union. Kissinger flies secretly to Beijing in July 1971. In his very first meeting with Zhou Enlai, he rejects “two Chinas,” promises troop withdrawal, pledges to suppress Taiwan independence movements, and tells Zhou the political evolution will go "in the direction which Prime Minister Chou En-lai indicated," i.e., reunification. Johnny Harris’s video  calls this “tactfully vague,” but really what happens here is dramatic concessions on Taiwan (that contradicted US policy).

4. Nixon goes further. In February 1972, he privately tells Zhou there are "Five Principles" he can "count on no matter what we say on other topics." First among them: "There is one China and Taiwan is a part of China." He's remarkably candid that the public language will be crafted differently.

   The problem here is not what we are going to do, the problem is what we are going to say about it. [source ]

5. The Shanghai Communiqué is crafted as a cover story. Nixon asks Zhou for help writing language "clever enough to find language which will meet your need yet does not stir up the animals so much that they gang up on Taiwan and thereby torpedo our initiative" (source) . In the end, the US “acknowledges” China's position rather than “recognizes” it. This is a lie that China “approves,” knowing the private agreement. Strategic ambiguity here is merely for the US at this point, not for some broader excuse that allows US to defend Taiwan.

   • i.e., Nixon tells Zhou that the public communiqué will be fuzzy, but that's to protect him politically so he can actually deliver his private promise.

     I will simply sum up by saying I do not want to be forced when I return to the United States, in a press conference or by Congressional leaders, to make a strong basically pro-Taiwan statement because of what has been said here. This is because it will make it very difficult to deliver on the policy which I have already determined I shall follow. [source ]

6. Taiwan gets orphaned diplomatically. In October 1971 they get expelled from the UN entirely. 1979 under Carter: the US formally recognizes the PRC, severs diplomatic relations with Taiwan, closes the Taipei embassy, ends the mutual defense treaty, withdraws all troops.

7. Congress fights back and we are left with “dual deterrence.” The Taiwan Relations Act (1979) commits the US to maintain the capacity to defend Taiwan and sell it weapons. Reagan's Six Assurances (1982) tell Taiwan the US has "not agreed to take any position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan." Congress reasserts that Taiwan's status is "undetermined" (the very language Nixon promised Zhou he'd kill). This is where strategic ambiguity begins: to allow the US to potentially defend Taiwan without directly without directly promising to. This deters China from invading (because the US might intervene) while also deterring Taiwan from declaring independence (because the US might not).